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RÉSUMÉ
L’amitié de même que d’autres relations intimes ont créé des difficultés pour les philosophes
moraux. Bien que la morale semble exiger que nous demeurions impartiaux, l’amitié semble don-
ner naissance à des obligations de partialité envers nos proches. Mais cette difficulté peut dis-
paraître une fois que l’on cesse de se concentrer sur la catégorisation des raisons en tant que
morales ou non morales. Cette tendance à classer les raisons comme morales vs. non morales
nous mène à accorder la place d’honneur à l’étiquette « moral » et à supposer que cette catégo-
rie est uniforme. Si nous abandonnons ces suppositions, alors les raisons données par nos pro-
ches ou nos amis ne nous sembleront plus problématiques. Il sera alors possible de voir que tou-
tes les raisons sont, en bout de ligne, egocentriques d’une importante façon, et que la délibéra-
tion doit toujours provenir d’une perspective egocentrique.
ABSTRACT
Friendship and other intimate relationships have created difficulties for moral philosophers. While
morality seems to require us to remain impartial between persons, friendship seems to generate
demands or obligations of partiality toward our intimates. But the difficulty can be removed once
we cease to focus on categorizing reasons as moral or non-moral. This tendency to divide rea-
sons into categories of moral vs. non-moral leads us to give those that we label ‘moral’ pride of
place and to assume that the category must be uniform. If we abandon these assumptions,
then reasons of intimacy or friendship will no longer be so puzzling. We will then be able to see
that all reasons, in the end, are importantly egocentric, and that deliberation must always pro-
ceed from an egocentric perspective.
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Friendships, and other intimate relationships, have often created dif-
ficulties for moral philosophers. From the perspective of someone
party to such a relationship, it seems as though one is obligated to
care for one’s friend (or other intimate1) before and to a greater extent
than one is obligated to care for a stranger or mere acquaintance. If
one is standing on a sinking ship and can only save a friend or a
stranger, flipping a coin as a procedure for deciding whom to save
seems not only absurd but also repugnant. It seems that if one enga-
ges in such a procedure or ends up saving the stranger, the friend is
entitled to feel outrage, hurt, anger, and betrayal.
But moral philosophers have been inclined to run into trou-
ble when they come to justifying the attitude and resultant actions of
real-world friends. In so far as we understand ourselves as being obli-
gated or required to care for our friends out of proportion to their
need, it seems that we take friendship as generating moral demands
on us. Does morality, though, really allow us to differentiate between
persons merely on the basis of their contingent relationships to us?
Further, how could morality actually demand that we give our friends
and intimates such special consideration?
It is evident then that we need to understand not only friend-
ship but also the nature of morality if we are to resolve these ten-
sions. In what follows, I will argue that placing too much signifi-
cance on a reason’s being a moral reason can make matters seem
much more complicated and problematic than they really are. Once
we start dividing reasons into categories, we tend to give those we
label ‘moral’ pride of place and also assume that the category must
be uniform. If we abandon these assumptions, reasons of friendship
(or, intimacy) will no longer be so puzzling.
I will take as my focus consequentialism, and I will do so for
several reasons: it is paradigmatically a moral theory, it displays some
features that it has in common with other paradigmatic moral theo-
ries such as Kantianism, it has achieved (in combination with
Kantianism) a kind of dominance in contemporary ethical theorizing,
it is notorious for the way that it deals with intimate relationships
such as friendship, and, perhaps most importantly, it is, I think, highly
plausible and attractive. At the end of the paper, I will make some
brief remarks about virtue theory and friendship.
UTILITARIANISM2 AS PARADIGM
Utilitarians understand morality as involving one, and only
one, fundamental principle, the principle of utility: right action is that
action which, out of all alternatives available to the agent, produces
the greatest net sum of intrinsic value for all sentient beings affec-
ted in the long run.3 There are three features of this principle, as I
am understanding it, that are particularly relevant for our purposes:
it is universalistic, it is impartial, and it involves a non-relativistic
conception of intrinsic value.
First, the principle is universalistic: it requires the agent to
consider the consequences of her actions for all persons affected.
Thus, in deciding how to distribute my disposable income, I am not
to think only about my friends and other loved ones, but about all
persons whose welfare might be promoted through use of that income.4
Second, in considering all such persons, I am not allowed to give any
greater weight to the interests of my friends; in other words, I am
required to be impartial between potential beneficiaries of my actions.5
The universalistic impartiality of utilitarianism is in stark
contrast to the commonsense thinking that I outlined in the opening
to this paper. Commonsense seems to require me not to give equal
weight to the interests of strangers and to the interests of friends. As
I said, anyone who does so seems to deserve moral condemnation. If
I am in a lifeboat with room for only one more and I pull a stran-
ger out of the water rather than my best friend, it seems that I have
not done what I ought to have done.6
Utilitarians, of course, have spent a lot of time and effort
trying to accommodate commonsense thinking on points such as these.
As Sidgwick famously argued, we are in a better epistemic and cau-
sal position for benefiting intimates such as friends than we are for
benefiting strangers: we know the needs and desires of our friends
and are well placed to satisfy those desires and to meet those needs.7
But it is important to see that whatever partiality to friends utilita-
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rianism can get us, it is necessarily derivative. The fundamental uti-
litarian principle is impartial between persons, and any partiality must
be justified as being ultimately productive of maximal value for all
persons considered equally. And there is certainly no guarantee that
such derivative partiality will extend to pulling my best friend rather
than the stranger into the lifeboat.
Now, of course, counterexamples have been the staple recourse
of all those who have wanted to reject utilitarianism. Surely we ought
not hang the innocent man! Surely we ought not break the death-bed
promise! Surely we ought not cut people up and distribute their
organs! Surely we ought to pull our best friends into lifeboats! But
we have to give utilitarianism its due, and it is precisely those fea-
tures of the theory that lead to counterintuitive results that make it a
paradigm of a moral theory. Morality, whatever it is, has to be contras-
ted with self-interest, it seems, and has to involve some sort of reco-
gnition of the equal worth of all persons. How can contingencies such
as friendships affect life and death moral decisions? After all, we
become friends with others for any number of arbitrary reasons: she
lived next door to me, he entered graduate school in the same year
as I, we shared a cell in the county lock-up, etc. If all persons are
of equal moral worth, how could I be justified in showing differen-
tial concern for someone because she is my friend, given that her
becoming my friend might be the result of some quirk of fate? 
For this same kind of reason, classical utilitarians eschewed
any appeal to a relativized theory of intrinsic value. If the value of
something for an agent was a matter of the agent’s subjective atti-
tude toward that thing, then the utilitarian could easily accommodate
the intuitions about friendship: my caring about my friend makes my
friend’s life much more subjectively valuable to me than the life of
the stranger.8 But morality, it might be said, must contrast with self-
interest, and an appeal to a relativized conception of intrinsic value,
according to some, would turn utilitarianism into a theory about the
latter rather than about the former.9
There is, however, another route to making utilitarianism com-
patible with our commonsense understanding of the demands of
friendship. One could adopt utilitarianism as a moral theory, leaving
its universalistic impartiality and non-relativistic theory of intrinsic
value intact, but claim that moral reasons must compete against other
reasons, such as reasons of self-interest and reasons of friendship.
The obstacle to taking this course is another feature that many attri-
bute to those reasons characterized as moral: they are overriding. So,
it is said, even if we have reasons that are non-moral, it is rational
or permissible to act on them only when there are no moral reasons
supporting an opposing course of conduct. Whatever moral reasons
are, some philosophers argue, they take precedence over mere self-
interest, etc. For both the classical utilitarians and for Kant, rationa-
lity and morality do not come apart. (Below, I will explain why I do
not accept these claims.)
THE COMMONSENSE CONTRAST
Our ordinary practices of justification, on the other hand, allow
diverse kinds of facts to provide grounds for reasons. Most impor-
tantly for our purposes, the fact that Tracy is my friend seems to
ground a reason for me to care for her before and to a greater extent
than I have reason to care for strangers or mere acquaintances. These
non-derivative reasons to be partial are, as we have seen, quite ruled
out by our paradigm of a moral theory, utilitarianism. So how are we
to accommodate such reasons?
The peculiar difficulty posed by reasons of friendship (or, more
generally, intimacy) is that they seem to occupy a ground somewhere
between the paradigmatic moral reasons and reasons of self-interest.
Unlike the paradigmatic moral reasons defined by the principle of
utility, reasons of friendship are partial and non-universalistic: they
require the agent to take into account the interests only of those per-
sons who happen to stand in the friendship relation to her, and they
require her to give the interests of such persons greater weight in her
deliberations about how to use her resources. Unlike reasons of self-
interest, reasons of friendship often require sacrifices on the part of
the agent: the agent is sometimes required to promote her friend’s
good at the cost of her own good.10
If we continue to think in terms of the paradigm of moral rea-
sons as defined by utilitarianism, then, in so far as they are not impar-
tial or universalistic, reasons of friendship seem not to qualify as
moral reasons. And yet commonsense, as I have said, understands
friendship as generating obligations, a category of reasons typically
categorized as moral. So one way that we can carve up the territory
of reasons might be in terms of moral vs. non-moral reasons, where
the former are understood as demands whereas the latter are not. It
is certainly true that when we talk about morality, we talk in terms
of duties, requirements, demands, obligations, etc. ‘Ought’ language
63
ARTICLES
ARTICLES
L E S  A T E L I E R S  D E  L ’ É T H I Q U E   È V .  3  N .  1   È P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G  2 0 0 8
seems peculiarly at home in the realm of morality. Then we can say
that moral demands fall into two categories, the impartial universa-
listic and the partial non-universalistic, with friendship being of the
latter sort.
The problem with taking this approach to understanding mora-
lity is that it doesn’t seem to make much sense to divide reasons into
those that constitute demands and those that do not. A reason to do
P is a consideration in favor of doing P. One ought to perform an
action P, it seems, when the balance of reasons is in favor of doing
P. What could it be for a reason to constitute something other than
a demand? If a fact constitutes or grounds a reason, then it must have
a strength relative to other reasons. Rationality, then, is a matter of
acting on one’s strongest reasons in the circumstances. So if there are
reasons of self-interest, they must be demands in the same sense that
reasons of friendship or utilitarian reasons are demands.11
For similar reasons, I think that it is not plausible to suppose that
there is more than one type of reason and yet to claim that one type,
perhaps the moral (whatever we decide that is) is always overriding.
Again, if reasons are considerations in favor of action, then why sup-
pose that one type of consideration will always outweigh considera-
tions of any other type? Consider a case of a reason of self-interest
competing against a utilitarian reason: suppose that if I do what I
want (or what will give me pleasure, or what will satisfy my infor-
med-desires) that I will produce ever, ever so slightly less intrinsic
value than if I made a sacrifice (a rather large sacrifice, let us sup-
pose). Is it really plausible to suppose that if I have a reason of self-
interest to do what I want that it is necessarily overridden by the
impartial utilitarian reason? Is it plausible to suppose that I ought not
to pull my friend into the lifeboat if a teeny tiny bit more value could
be produced by doing otherwise? Is it plausible to suppose that I am
always required to make sacrifices for my friend at the cost of my
own good? It seems implausible to suppose that we could know a
priori which type of reason will outweigh others.
We need to start over, I think, if we are to understand reasons
and their relationship to the deliberation and actions of agents in the
real world.
REASONS AND AGENTS
Discussions of reasons and deliberations have often been cou-
ched in terms of different perspectives. Thomas Nagel, for example,
claimed that the ‘view from nowhere’ was the vantage point from
which one could recognize one’s agent-neutral reasons, i.e. those rea-
sons, the statement of which, involves no essential reference to the
agent. From this perspective we are capable of acknowledging ‘imper-
sonal value.’12
The view from nowhere, of course, is Nagel’s version of the
impartial spectator, the hypothetical individual famously appealed to
by Hume and Adam Smith and by the classical utilitarians as a heu-
ristic device. This perspective is supposed to stand in contrast with
the egocentric perspective of a particular agent, a perspective from
which some things have a personal value to the agent that is out of
proportion to the impersonal value that would be recognized from the
view from nowhere. Nagel’s example is the climbing of Mount
Kilimanjaro: in so far as an agent very much wants to climb the
mountain, her climbing of the mountain has great personal value for
her. But if the agent takes up the viewpoint of an impartial specta-
tor, she will be able to acknowledge that her climbing of the moun-
tain has less in the way of impersonal than of personal value, and
certainly no more impersonal value than anyone else’s climbing of
the mountain.13
Once we assume the view from nowhere, supposedly we will
see that our own friendships are no more nor less valuable than anyone
else’s, in general. Of course, we might actually come to see that some
of our own friendships are less worth promoting than some friend-
ships to which we are not party. When we reassume our own ego-
centric perspective, our own friendships loom large, eclipsing those
of other persons. In fact, the comparative value of these friendships
rarely enters our minds: all that we typically consider is that these
are my friendships, those are not. And now we are at the point where
Sidgwick found himself at the end of The Methods of Ethics: prac-
tical reason seems split between the impartial view from nowhere and
the partial egocentric view.
But this is a misguided way of thinking about practical rea-
son. There is really only an egocentric perspective from which one
can acknowledge various grounds of reasons that one has. After all,
consider the principle of utility, our paradigm of impartiality: right
action is that action which, out of all alternatives available to the
agent, produces the greatest net sum of intrinsic value for all persons
affected in the long run. Even after I assume the vantage point of
the impartial spectator, I have to locate a particular agent’s causal/epis-
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temic position in order to determine the right action for that agent.
Just seeing what impersonal intrinsic value is out there waiting to be
promoted is not sufficient for understanding the rational demands
upon a particular agent. So, in essence, reasons are always reason for
an agent. It is, at best, misleading to talk about reasons simpliciter.
Certain states of affairs have (impersonal) intrinsic value, but their
having that value is not sufficient to draw any conclusions about
anyone’s actual reasons: all that we can conclude is that if an agent S
is in a position to promote the value, then S has a reason to do so. 
It will help to consider our ontological options here. One
option would be to hold that the property of being a reason super-
venes on a complicated state of affairs, the state of affairs of an intrin-
sically valuable fact’s standing in a certain relationship to an agent,
call it the ‘capable of being promoted by’ relation. According to this
ontological picture, the grounds of consequentialist reasons always
involve an intrinsically valuable state of affairs, a particular agent,
and the agent’s relationship to the state of affairs.
Another option is not for the ontologically faint of heart – it
is not for those who always have Occam’s Razor at the ready.
According to this second possible ontological picture, we would hold
that there is no property of being a reason simpliciter. Rather, there
are many properties of being a reason for S, where states of affairs
that are intrinsically valuable come to have such properties when they
stand in the ‘capable of being promoted relation’ to S. According to
this second account, reasons for agents are a function of the nature
of the state of affairs not only considered in itself but also conside-
red in its relations to rational beings in the world.14 What is crucial
is that according to either of these two ontological accounts, the very
existence of reasons is a function of agents and their relations to
various features of the world.
Deliberative perspectives, then, are, of necessity, always ego-
centric. The agent’s causal position and knowledge of the world are
factors that are crucial to determining the nature of her reasons for
action. So now we have no split between deliberative perspectives on
the world, we only have various egocentric perspectives on the world,
and, for each agent, her reasons are a matter of her perspective. This
does not move us to a Hobbesian or Humean conception of practi-
cal reason, as long as we acknowledge that there is objective intrin-
sic value in the world. But what is relevant for me is the objective
value that I am in a position to promote.
Once we find ourselves securely situated in the egocentric
perspective as the appropriate perspective for deliberation, allowing
relationships between the agent and a state of affairs to play a role
in the generation of reasons, we can see that relationships other than
those of a causal/epistemic nature can also do that work. The fact
that a state of affairs involves my friend’s good or involves the main-
tenance of my friendship can have the property of being a reason for
me to promote it while not having the property of being a reason for
some other agent to promote it. Or, if my friend’s good or our friend-
ship is objectively intrinsically valuable, and that other agent is in a
position to promote it, then she has a reason to promote it, but I have
more reason to do so than she does.
Now it is true that a disanalogy remains between reasons of
intimacy and consequentialist reasons. The former are, in an impor-
tant sense, doubly relative to a particular agent. Recall that our conse-
quentialist reasons are a function of our causal/epistemic relation to
an intrinsically valuable state of affairs, where the property of being
intrinsically valuable is a function of the intrinsic nature of the state
of affairs – it in no way depends on the agent. Our reasons of inti-
macy are also a function of our causal/epistemic relation to a state
of affairs. What kind of state of affairs? One that involves caring for
a friend or sustaining the relationship with that friend. So my rea-
sons of intimacy are a function both of (i) my causal/epistemic rela-
tion to a state of affairs, and (ii) the nature of a certain state of affairs.
However, (ii) the nature of the relevant state of affairs that grounds
reasons of intimacy is not intrinsic to that state of affairs, but is a
matter of its relation to the agent – the relevant state of affairs will
be one that involves the good of my friend or the sustenance of my
friendship with a particular person.
Does this extra element of agent-relativity pose a problem? I
don’t see why it should. In fact, I think that when we are ensconced
in our egocentric deliberative perspectives, it is self-evident that our
reasons are a function of various kinds of relationships that bind us
to the world: some of those relationships are merely a matter of our
coming to recognize our ability to promote objective value, while
others are a matter of our standing in special relationships to other
persons and our recognizing that our ability to care for such persons
and promote those special relationships. Once the complex agent-rela-
tivity of reasons and deliberation is granted, there is no reason to
deny additional levels of agent-relativity, especially given that doing
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so allows us to capture so much of our commonsense thinking about
our deliberative and rational places in the world.
At this point we have not yet made the process of practical
deliberation easy, but that should not be a goal of any theory of rea-
sons for action. We all know that practical deliberation is not easy.
And we have jettisoned the baggage of trying to divide reasons into
overriding moral reasons and non-moral reasons. So each delibera-
tive situation is a matter of trying to figure out all of one’s reasons
and then trying to determine which is the strongest in the circums-
tances. I am inclined to agree with Ross that there is no algorithm
for doing this, that each practical deliberation is a risky situation and
that one may never know for sure whether one acted rationally.15
So let’s return for a moment to the lifeboat, where I have to
decide whether to pull my friend to safety or to help a stranger. Such
cases provide no counterexample to the claim that the principle of
utility is the statement of one source of our reasons. Rather, what
they show is that there are other sources of reasons, and that our
example is one in which one of those other reasons clearly outweighs
any reason to maximize objective intrinsic value. Bernard Williams
famously used a similar case to attempt to undermine utilitarianism,
claiming that the utilitarian would bring into deliberation “one thought
too many,” that the thought ‘that’s my friend’ (or, in Williams’ case,
‘that’s my wife’) should settle the matter.16 In fact, I am arguing, uti-
litarian deliberation involves at least one thought too few, and, in fact,
probably several thoughts too few. The importance of objective value
in no way leads to a denigration of friendship, but neither does the
importance of friendship lead to a denigration of intrinsic value. If
we really were occupying the view from nowhere, we could not act
because we would not have a position from which to act. Given that
we occupy a particular position, we acquire many diverse reasons for
action. There is really nothing at all problematic about this.
One traditional worry about rendering moral reasons less than
overriding is that doing so seems to leave open the possibility that it
might be rational to be immoral, and, perhaps, an agent could find
herself in a situation in which morality never presents itself as ratio-
nal. I grant that it sounds odd to say that it is rational to be immo-
ral, but that is because we tend to read the moral ‘ought’ as the all-
things-considered ‘ought,’ and it is certainly odd to say that it is ratio-
nal not to do what, all-things-considered, one ought to do – in fact,
it is just plain contradictory. But it is certainly not contradictory to
say that it is rational not to maximize objective value. The term ‘moral’
obfuscates more than it helps, and once we jettison it, we can focus
on reasons, trying to determine, a posteriori, which reason is the
strongest in any given situation. 
One final point about persons for whom it might never be
rational to promote objective intrinsic value: no matter what it is ratio-
nal for such persons to do, it will probably remain rational for us to
incarcerate or even eliminate such persons. Consider a psychopath
such as Ted Bundy. Bundy told his interviewers that ‘he’ never ima-
gined that anyone would miss ‘his’17 victims; after all, there are so
many people in the world, and people go missing all of the time.
Bundy’s use of moral and sympathetic language reveals that he wasn’t
in complete possession of the relevant concepts; for example, whe-
never he talks of ‘his’ remorse, it is always tied to ‘his’ fears of being
caught, never to the pain to ‘his’ victims and their friends and fami-
lies that ‘he’ has caused. I have no doubt that Bundy completely
lacked the capacity to recognize objective value in the world. He also
lacked the ability to be genuinely intimate with another human being,
as is clear from his lack of ability to understand how loved ones
might miss a particular person regardless of how many people exist
and how many go missing. So Bundy had no consequentialist rea-
sons and no reasons of intimacy: he was an agent whose rational
sphere was severely truncated. This had two consequences: he lacked
the ability to lead a life rich in value and meaning, and we had rea-
sons to contain Bundy, both in the service of intrinsic value and in
the service of pure self-interest and love for others in the world. A
perfectly rational being, such as Bundy would have been had he not
sometimes acted so incautiously, might still be a sad and pathetic
figure that we have every reason to both loathe and pity.
VIRTUE THEORY AND THE EGOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE
As intimate relationships such as friendship have garnered
more attention in moral philosophy, virtue theory has simultaneously
experienced a significant resurgence of interest and popularity. Given
what I have said so far, it seems clear why these two trends seem to
go hand in hand. Virtue theory begins from an egocentric perspec-
tive: the focus, for each agent, is on the cultivation of her own vir-
tuous states of character. So just as the agent has reason to be a bene-
volent person, she has reason to be a good, caring friend. If reasons
are fundamentally reasons to have certain character traits, then virtue
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theory seems to be a moral theory that avoids some of the difficul-
ties that I discussed before.
However, I think that either (i) virtue theory cannot be unders-
tood as a distinct type of theory of reasons for action, or (ii) it is a
highly implausible theory about our primary reasons for action.
Consider the types of settled motivations that characterize being a
good friend: aiming at the friend’s good, expressing sympathy for a
friend’s plight, promoting the maintenance of the friendship, etc. None
of these motivations have as their object the agent’s own character;
rather, each is aimed at the performance of some action or the sus-
taining or promoting of some external state of affairs. In so far as I
have reason to cultivate being a good friend, that is just a matter of
my having reason to be responsive to the basic reasons arising out
of friendship. So there must be reasons that precede any reasons per-
taining to the cultivation of virtue; in fact, the cultivation of virtue
would seem to amount to nothing more than being rational. Thus, we
need a theory of reasons, before we can have a theory of virtue and
good character.
It might be said that, in fact, our primary reason is to deve-
lop the virtues in ourselves, and that we can somehow characterize
the virtues without appealing to other reasons we have. Even if this
were possible, I think that virtue theory would have become egocen-
tric in the wrong way. All of our reasons are a function of our indi-
vidual perspectives, but it seems clear to me that some of our rea-
sons take as their object states of affairs that do not essentially involve
us. For example, we have reason to promote the welfare of others
regardless of what impact doing so has on our own characters. It is
important to develop a theory of reasons that is egocentric in the right
way: all reasons are reasons for the agent, but not all reasons are
about, in some way, the agent herself. I am the agent, so my reasons
are a function of my particular place in the world, but I occupy a
place in a world that is not all about me, and my reasons must reflect
that fact.
CONCLUSIONS
I am recommending, then, that we be careful when we use
the term ‘moral.’ The term has a lot of baggage, baggage that can
lead our attention away from the subtleties and complexities of ratio-
nal deliberation. All deliberation is egocentric, but that does not mean
that all deliberation is egoistic: all of my reasons are reasons for me,
but not all of my reasons are about me. (Unless I am a psychopath,
lacking the ability to recognize various normative features of the world
and unable to develop meaningful, intimate relationships with other
persons.) Attempts to neatly divide our reasons into moral and non-
moral can mislead us into thinking that there are different delibera-
tive perspectives. What we need to recognize is that the world contains
many and diverse features of rational import, and we need to be able
to simultaneously remain ensconced in our egocentric perspectives
while still seeing beyond ourselves.
67
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NOTES
1 I will use ‘friend’ as a general term for all persons with whom we are
intimate. Some philosophers limit the use of the term ‘friend’ to refer to
the parties to certain types of intimate relationships, for example, some do
not think that the term ‘friend’ can appropriately be used to refer to par-
ties to relationships that involve some sort of disparity in power and/or
authority, such as the parent/young child relationship. I do not intend to
be taking any stand on such issues - I am simply adopting ‘friend’ as a
handy term to use to talk about intimates.
2 I will use ‘utilitarianism’ and ‘consequentialism’ interchangeably. I unders-
tand utilitarianism as any consequentialist theory that employs a welfarist
conception of intrinsic value, i.e. some conception of intrinsic value accor-
ding to which all and only the welfare of sentient creatures has intrinsic
value. Utilitarians, then, may differ about the proper understanding of the
concept of welfare: is it pleasure? Desire satisfaction? Informed-desire
satisfaction?
3 My statement of the principle of utility is a statement of that principle in
its actual consequence act- utilitarian version. Nothing in my discussion
would be affected by substitution of, for example, a possible- or probable-
consequence version of the principle. However, we do need to hold
constant that the principle involves an appeal to a non-relativistic concep-
tion of intrinsic value, as I make clear in what follows.
4 I am, simply for expository purposes, ignoring the distinction between uti-
litarianism as a theory of right action and utilitarianism as a decision pro-
cedure. Of course, it might be the case that a good utilitarian agent will,
in her actual thought, give greater weight to loved ones, if doing so will,
in the long run, produce greater intrinsic value. Perhaps each of us ought
to make ourselves into the kind of person who thinks along commonsense
lines. But then, of course, our general personality traits and dispositions
that give extra weight to our loved ones are justified by a line of reaso-
ning that itself gives no greater weight to the interests of our loved ones.
See Railton, Peter, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of
Morality”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13, 1984, pp.134-171.
5 I am, of course, also required to be impartial between myself and other
persons, friends or strangers. So utilitarianism will sometimes morally
require me to refuse to make a sacrifice for a friend, if maximal value
would result from my not making that sacrifice. Another counterintuitive
feature of utilitarianism, then, is that it will not regard all personal sacrifi-
ces for the sake of loved ones as morally commendable.
6 All else being equal, of course. Thus, for example, the stranger does not
have the cure for AIDS in her head, is not someone whom I have promi-
sed to help, my friend is not terminally ill or a serial killer, etc.
7 Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics, Indianapolis, IN, Hackett
Publishing Company, 1981 (1907), pp.432ff.
8 For a thorough defense of a relativistic version of consequentialism, see
Fumerton, Richard, Reason and Morality: A Defense of the Egocentric
Perspective, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1990.
9 Those philosophers who advocate a relativized version of consequentialism
would disagree with this characterization of their view.
10 I am ignoring those views according to which friends are ‘other selves,’
and, thus, benefits to friends are benefits to the agent. I find such views
highly counterintuitive. For an interesting defense of such a view, see
Brink, David, “Rational Egoism, Self, and Others,” in Flanagan, Owen,
and Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg, eds., Identity, Character, and Morality:
Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1997,
pp.339-378.
11 So I do not think that the language of ‘permissions’ used by many moral
philosophers makes much sense: either my reason of self-interest out-
weighs my moral reason, and rationality demands that I act on it, or vice
versa.
12 Nagel, Thomas, The View From Nowhere, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1986, pp.164ff.
13 Ibid, p.167.
14 I have stated these metaphysical pictures in non-reductionist terms, rende-
ring the property of being a reason or of being a reason for S sui generis.
If one does not have my non-reductionist leanings, one could restate them
in terms of reasons being constituted by certain facts rather than in terms
of reasons supervening on certain facts. This option would be covered by
the supervenience language if one allows that p being identical to q is a
form of p’s supervening on q.
15 See Ross, W. D., The Right and the Good, Indianapolis, IN, Hackett
Publishing Company, 1930, pp.30-31.
16 Williams, Bernard, “Persons, Character, and Morality,” in Moral Luck,
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.18.
17 I put the relevant pronouns in scare quote because Bundy’s interviewers
succeeded in getting Bundy to talk about his crimes only by allowing him
to describe them in the third person, as though Bundy were helping to
explicate how someone could commit the horrible crimes that he, Bundy,
had, supposedly, been wrongly accused of. See Aynesworth, Hugh, and
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Michaud, Stephen, Ted Bundy: Conversations with a Killer. The Death
Row Interviews, Irving, TX, Authorlink Press, 2000, p.188.
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